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Reappraising JournalismÕs Normative Foundations 
John Steel, University of Sheffield, UK 
Abstract 
The claim that journalism provides important nourishment for democratic life is 
remarkably resilient, despite criticisms emanating from a range of perspectives which 
highlight just how problematic this claim is. The central argument of this chapter is 
that the key normative claim of journalism, that being journalismÕs centrality to 
proper functioning democracy, is in need of significant re-consideration and 
reappraisal. In arguing for this, I suggest that we need to think more creatively about 
the very nature of democracy and democratic agency before we can hope to Ôre-thinkÕ 
journalism.  
Introduction  
To literally Ôrethink journalismÕ, requires a commitment to critically re-engage with 
some of the central ideas about the role and function of journalism today and what 
they pertain to. Much current debate about journalismÕs role has revolved around its 
significance to politics and, in particular, to those democratic processes that require 
transparency, accountability and which provide critical feedback to those in positions 
of power. As journalism is experiencing significant structural and social 
transformations, given the ways in which the economic environment is impacting on 
journalismÕs practices and products, it is worth considering these central normative 
positions afresh. In doing so I argue that in responding to the task of rethinking 
journalism, one must confront some of the key normative claims that have 
underpinned journalism historically and which continue to feed into our contemporary 
understanding of the purpose and role of journalism today. I suggest for the purposes 
of theory building that confronting journalismÕs normative foundations, particularly 
within the context of its purported democratic significance is a necessary, though not 
sufficient step in the right direction towards critically rethinking journalism.  
To be sure, the ideas that fuel contemporary thinking about journalism emerged 
from particular historical contexts and contingent values. Despite significant social 
and political crises, particularly during the twentieth century when journalism 
  2 
sustained autocratic, totalitarian, fascist and other less than democratic systems, we 
still accept that journalism fuels democracy. Indeed amidst the complexities of our 
contemporary political world it may be that we are simply asking too much of 
journalism in the present, given the dramatic historical shifts and political 
transformations that have occurred since the burgeoning public sphere of the 17
th
 and 
18
th
 centuries from which its normative core has been shaped. It is this sense of a 
growing lack of fit between the contemporary political context and those founding 
ideals of an informed and lively public sphere that is the motivating concern for this 
essay. However, rather than attempting to rethink journalism normatively from a 
virtual tabula rasa, I suggest that we look to the realms of political and democratic 
theory as a necessary precursor to any reformulation of journalismÕs normative core. 
The reason for this is that it was in the realm of ideas, most significantly political 
ideas involving debate and deliberation of an ever-expanding political community, 
where the normative expectations we have of journalism today were shaped. As such, 
in developing this argument I will focus my attention on the deliberative aspect of 
journalismÕs normative core and its central role in nourishing democracy, as this 
element is one of its most enduring and resilient elements. In stressing the centrality 
of the deliberative component of journalismÕs democratic functioning, I emphasise the 
rich historical legacy of journalism that has contributed to our contemporary 
expectations about what journalism should be today. From this I go on to examine the 
ways in which journalism is largely seen to be failing in its democratic mandate from 
different ends of the political spectrum. This is seen either in terms its relative 
inability to engage and stimulate a deliberative civic sphere; or because of the 
constraints placed upon it by so-called over-regulation and market interference. 
Finally I offer two very different theoretical analyses of democracy and particularly 
democratic deliberation that provide a useful counterpoint to the contemporary 
discussion about democracy and which IÕd suggest provide an innovative addition to 
the enterprise that motivates this volume.  
Journalism, deliberation and the Political Sphere 
The basis of my argument stems from an understanding of the key elements that 
underpin journalismÕs claims to a specifically democratic function Ð to hold power to 
account and to provide a voice for the public within the broader civil and public 
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sphere. My focus on journalismÕs democratic role is not to dismiss nor undervalue the 
range of other sources that have contributed to the development of journalism as I 
have pointed out elsewhere (Steel, 2009); but it is arguably journalismÕs service to the 
political and specifically liberal democratic polities that is the most resonant and 
robust of journalism's core claims today. Ironically it is these very features, or rather 
normative ideals that seem increasingly out of kilter with the contemporary world. I 
am of course talking here about the model of a deliberative rational public sphere 
facilitated in its democratic goals by diverse and representative media of which 
journalism is a key component. Such a deliberative ideal can be traced in the United 
States to the founding fathers' commitment to representative government and the 
Madisonian compulsion to protect free speech and freedom of the press so as to 
breathe life into the public. This ideal was articulated by Dewey in The Public and its 
Problems (1927), The Hutchins Commission (1947) and more recently by scholars 
such as Sunstein (1995), Dryzek, J (2002) and Haas (2007) who have all stated the 
significance of a deliberative democratic environment nourished by vibrant and 
representative forms of journalism (Steel, 2012). Within the European context of 
course we have the legacy of Habermas (1989) and his conception of the democratic 
public sphere that became corrupted by capitalism's propensity towards the 
atomisation and fragmentation of the very essence of the public. The present 
neoliberal era such as it is, seems more than ever to have limited the possibilities of a 
dynamic, rich and deliberative rational public sphere despite the rapid technological 
transformations in the communications ecology.  
Attempting to re-engage with the normative foundations of journalismÕs 
democratic functions requires a brief summary of their claims. The overarching 
principle here is that within a representative liberal democratic polities the public 
must have access to the processes of government in order for this same government to 
have legitimacy. To borrow from Jeremy Bentham, journalism provides Ôsecurity 
against misruleÕ by ensuring that elected representatives in government are exercising 
their power in the interests of the people that they represent and not in their own 
narrow self-interests. Journalism then provides a check on power and it is this element 
of journalismÕs rational core that has remained a constant feature since the birth of 
democratic institutions in Europe and North America in the late 18
th
 and 19
th
 centuries 
(Copeland, 2006). 
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government and journalismÕs democratic credentials require that it perform another 
equally important function, that of it also serving as a proxy for the public, 
scrutinising government and holding it to account on behalf of the wider community. 
As Dahlgren (2009) has suggested Ôjournalism lays claim to accurate and impartial 
renderings of a reality that exists independently of its tellingÕ and Ôserves as an 
integrative force and as a common form for debateÕ (p. 41). He continues Ôeven if 
journalism in the real world has never operated quite in this way, this paradigmatic 
model of how it should be has guided our understanding and expectations of itÕ (p. 
41). The claims of impartiality and holding power to account are particularly 
problematic, as this is where journalism is often seen as failing. At best it is selective 
in shining light on Ôbad governmentÕ, at worst it colludes with the very powers that it 
purportedly holds to account.  
Whilst there is insufficient space here for delving into debates about ownership, 
influence and journalistic autonomy, it is necessary for the purposes of this argument 
to look more closely at this idea that government should be held to account by 
journalism and that journalists should somehow facilitate or represent forms of public 
response to the actions of their political representatives. Holding government to 
account involves journalists, on behalf of the public, having the ability to both 
scrutinise the practices and performance of government and the power to censure 
those in power. The principle of freedom of the press then provides the moral 
framework for journalists to censure government on behalf of the public without fear 
of sanction. Yet it is this expectation that journalism represents the interests of the 
People in the political realm that generally exposes its weaknesses. In other words, 
though journalism might at certain moments expose corruption and highlight 
wrongdoing of those in public office, thereby facilitating the legitimation of its 
political power, its ability to reflect and represent the interests of the public has long 
been open to question.  
Historically the relationship between journalism and the public has revolved 
around the so-called Lippmann - Dewey debate and variations of this polemic have 
remained constant throughout the twentieth century and into the twenty-first 
(Schudson, 2008). The main questions it generates are: should the public have the 
journalism that it wants - sensational, trashy, entertaining yet exposing public officials 
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if they step out of line; or, should journalism aspire to do more than entertain and fill 
the coffers of the multinational owners and conglomerates? Shouldn't journalism be 
more than about making money and protecting vested interests and be motivated by a 
desire to represent the diversity of public opinion? Indeed shouldn't journalism 
engage the public and stimulate a more rational democratic civic space as envisaged 
by so many? From the Hutchins Commission in the United States in the mid-twentieth 
century through to the various Royal Commissions, Calcutt Reports and the Leveson 
Inquiry in the UK (Steel, 2012), this polemic which argues that journalism either 
gives the public what they want or serves the democratic, deliberative aspects of 
public life has been prominent. It has specifically been the debate about journalismÕs 
role in stimulating and cultivating a more inclusive democratic culture that has 
arguably been core to some of the more critical analyses of journalism (Muhlmann, 
2010; Curran & Seaton, 2010; Keane, 1991). Yet this deliberative ideal has also been 
the most problematic for those wishing to reform the corroding influences on an 
idealised version of journalism as it should be. Though the seeds of this deliberative 
component are varied, we only need to look at two examples from opposing ends of 
the political spectrum, to see just how powerful and influential such a focus on the 
importance of public deliberation has been. Indeed it is within these contributions that 
the limitations of our current normative expectations might be exposed as much of our 
understanding of public deliberation and its rational power stems from these two sets 
of ideas. The two thinkers that I'd like to highlight are John Stuart Mill and Jurgen 
Habermas.  
To focus on a discussion of democratic deliberation by highlighting the work of 
John Stuart Mill might seem a strange choice. Especially given that he was not 
convinced that all members of society, at that juncture in history, had the intellectual 
capacity to understand and embrace the complexities of Victorian political life. As 
such Mill is not someone who might be signalled as the most obvious proponent of 
the sort of democratic values that underpin some of journalismÕs more salient 
deliberative ideals today. However Mill certainly saw the power of deliberation as an 
essential requirement for any mature society to progress. MillÕs treatment of the role 
of the press is crucial as it signifies how debate and discussion within a broader public 
sphere facilitated social and political progress within advanced liberal democratic 
societies (Wishy, 1959). Contained within his so-called Ôtruth argumentÕ and its 
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contextualisation in On Liberty (1859), Mill envisages a public space in which 
individuals are protected against infringements against their autonomy from the state 
and, importantly, from each other. On Liberty therefore sets up the context in which 
the deliberative power of an unfettered press provides the space within which the 
public can express their concerns and opinions freely as a component of their 
individual autonomy. Furthermore MillÕs so called Ôtruth argumentÕ (Schauer, 1982; 
Haworth, 1998) emphasises just how important the Ôliberty of thought and expressionÕ 
are in sustaining a progressive and dynamic society. Despite the fact that Mill was 
seen by his contemporaries as more of a radical than a liberal (Reese, 1985), it is 
MillÕs contribution to contemporary liberalism and democratic theory that is worth 
emphasising as it is via his understanding of individual autonomy and of the 
safeguards required to protect the individual from both the state and the incursions of 
wider public opinion on individuals, that we appreciate the separation of public and 
private spheres within which an enlightened deliberative public would thrive. On 
Liberty is significant because the limits required to protect individual freedom, also 
serve the wider public good as these provide scope for a public deliberative space 
through which rational discourse and progressive politics can thrive. Journalism's 
contribution to this public space, as in the early 19th century era of the unstamped 
radical press, as Hollis (1970) and Chalaby (1998) have pointed out, would be varied 
and representative of a wide variety of interests and constituencies within society.  
In a similar vein, Habermas (1989) idealises a rational discursive realm in 
which open and representative democratic discourse enriches a political sphere where 
citizens consult, debate and deliberate on matters of social significance and 
importance. For Mill it was the lack of education amongst the majority of the 
population and the stifling effects of public opinion that damaged the deliberative 
capacity of the people and thereby rendered them largely unable to engage with the 
political process. For Habermas, it is the corrupting influence of capital and the 
priorities of self-interest that has polluted the deliberative context that is required for 
genuine democratic citizen engagement and participation. If it ever genuinely existed, 
journalism's era of public representation was, as Chalaby (1998) has pointed out, 
eventually eroded by the development of the industrial press and the imperatives of 
profit. Rather than embodying public facing values, journalism became commodified 
and any inclusive, representative and democratic core was diminished. Thus the 
  7 
'invention of journalism' heralded a simultaneous dilution of the public's deliberative 
capacity. Though never fully realised, this ideal of a deliberative active citizen 
engagement in matters of politics and public affairs continues to be seen as an 
important element of democratic life and one which requires journalism to play a 
significant role (Dahlgren, 2009). Both of the thinkers above, though at difficult ends 
of the ideological spectrum, envisage a deliberative space for members of society 
which is stimulated by journalism and which furnishes democracy with an engaged 
and lively citizenry.  
Broken Journalism and the degraded public sphere 
Thus far in this chapter I have sketched out some of the features that contribute to 
journalismÕs normative heart by emphasising one of the key values of deliberation. In 
this section I would like to develop my argument and assert that it is because of an 
uncritical acceptance of these cherished norms and core values, that leaves journalism 
requiring such a fundamental reconsideration. In this respect my argument resonates 
with those who suggest that we Ôde-coupleÕ journalism and democracy altogether (see 
Josephi, 2013; Nerone, 2013; Zelizer, 2013) as the linkage between the two concepts 
has become stale and in need of reappraisal. Indeed in ZelizerÕs view, democracy 
needs to be ÒretiredÓ from the equation altogether (Zelizer, 2013). To put it another 
way, the expectations that we have placed upon journalism to deliver the deliberative 
democratic nirvana that social and political theorists have promised us for 
generations, are at the root of the problem of journalism today.  
But what is the problem of journalism? If we look to attempts to reform 
journalism into something that would enable it to become more representative, 
deliberative and democratic we immediately see the problem. Journalism simply does 
not stimulate an informed and active participatory culture. It does not represent all 
society's constituent parts. It is precisely journalism's failure to deliver an informed, 
engaged and active participatory democratic public sphere that is generally 
understood to be at the root of journalism's problems and maybe even partly 
responsible for problems of political dissatisfaction and disengagement more broadly 
(Hay, 2007). Problems that are emphasised by journalism's cosy relationship to the 
same political authority that it ideally should be far more distanced from. If we look at 
the controversies surrounding the various attempts to reform journalism along more 
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democratic, deliberative and representative lines, then we see the scale of the 
problems confront the task of truly rethinking journalism. The aim of making our 
media more democratically accountable and journalists more responsible to the public 
is laudable and one that I have much sympathy with. The Leveson Inquiry report 
(2012) in particular highlighted not only the unethical depths to which some 
journalists have gone to in attempting to secure an exclusive story, but also the 
intimate and uncritical relationship that journalism can and does have with political 
and economic power. It also exposed a raw nerve in relation to how journalism might 
be reformed. The problem of ÔfixingÕ broken journalism brings with it the issue that 
has plagued it from its earliest inception: that being in order to remain independent 
and serve the public in scrutinising government, it should be detached from 
government and free from the constraints of regulation. Whilst the debate about the 
pros and cons of the Leveson recommendations for press reform continue, I suggest 
that those who aspire to reform journalism in a way that makes it more accountable, 
representative and deliberative, generally subscribe to the very same normative ideals 
as those who they are arguing against. This, as I will suggest below when highlighting 
the work of Dean (2009), makes progression unlikely.  
Those wishing to reform journalism and encourage it to become more 
deliberative and democratically responsible of course provide important critical 
spaces and pressure points that highlight where and how the commercial imperatives 
of media organisations stifle democratic deliberation and representation. 
Organisations such as the Campaign for Press and Broadcasting Freedom and the 
Media Reform Coalition gain intellectual substance from a long tradition of important 
critical scholarship into media systems, structures and processes and their impact on 
democratic life. Yet in their aspirations to ÔreformÕ media and journalism, in 
particular to make it more accountable, representative and diverse, such groups draw 
from essentially the same normative well as their adversaries, rather than imagining 
new bases for rethinking journalism, they tend to re-tread familiar ground. Likewise, 
the staunch neo-liberal 'Fourth Estatists', proprietors such as Rupert Murdock, editors 
such as Paul Dacre as well as advocacy organisations such as the ÔFreespeech 
NetworkÕ protest against ÔattacksÕ on freedom of the press via so-called state 
regulation or media monopolisation. The on-going debate about media regulation 
highlights the opposing ideological positions of the debate, yet both positions 
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essentially draw from the same intellectual sources that feed the familiar normative 
claims about what journalism should do as IÕve highlighted above. Such positions 
however are dependent upon a decrepit conception of political culture and democratic 
participation which sees journalism as a facilitator of democratic politics and guardian 
against tyranny, but canÕt deliver either because of the priorities of profit, or because 
of an over regulatory media environment. My own position falls well within the 
tradition of critical media scholarship, however, in continuing to draw from this 
traditional normative basis, we are missing the opportunity to move the debate on in 
more meaningful ways.  
Within critical journalism studies we see various areas of scholarship that look 
to examine journalism in ways that directly or indirectly re-affirm these normative 
foundations. Whether scholars are discussing media systems and political influence or 
the broader political economy of journalism and the media more generally, they 
generally do so from a familiar normative standpoint. The implicit and explicit 
normative claims that are made in areas of journalism studies scholarship that analyse 
media systems and structures in ways that emphasise, or more critically expose their 
inefficiencies and limitations with regard journalism's 'proper functioning', tend to 
stress journalism's relative inability to fulfil its democratic deliberative obligations, 
given the range of structural impediments it has to cope with, be they an over-
dependence on advertising; lack of editorial independence from owners; political 
influence or the various 'filters' and production practices news goes through before it 
is consumed (McChesney, 2004; Herman and Chomsky, 2008; Klaehn, 2005; Sznt, 
2007) tends to prioritise, at least implicitly, a specific normative aspiration about 
journalism's core values (see also Berry and Theobald, 2006). As noted, this is 
generally drawn from a rich intellectual heritage which, as I have stated, prioritises a 
deliberative ideal. Greater media plurality, accountability and enhanced media 
representation are articulated in order to challenge, or at least highlight, the 
commercial imperatives of large media corporations and stress the Ôdemocratic 
deficitÕ that contemporary business models of journalism promote (Phillips and 
Witschge, 2012).  
It is not solely in analysing journalismÕs structures that we find this narrative, as 
scholarship on the practice of journalism and those who ÔdoÕ journalism is also 
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significant. Work on journalism's role perceptions of course builds on the work of 
Donsbach (1993; 2010) and focuses on the lived experiences, perceptions and 
motivations of those working within journalism. The research highlights the ways in 
which journalists articulate and experience their work and the role, whether ideal or 
otherwise, that they play. This research is particularly valuable as it provides an 
insight into just how powerful and resonant the normative ideals of journalism are and 
the ways in which they are internalised by news workers (Eldridge II, 2014). Within 
such work we see expressions of (idealised) normative claims of journalism and its 
purported democratic functioning, within a reflective framework which highlights the 
contradictions and tendencies within the production of news and amongst news-
workers themselves. In contrast to the aforementioned more structural analyses, this 
work tends to draw on the lived experiences of those practicing to explore issues of 
identity and democratic functioning from the perspective of journalists and media 
workers themselves (Deuze, 2007, 2005; Shapiro, 2010). Though offering a valuable 
insight into the workings and changing dynamics of ÔjournalismÕ in different contexts, 
and providing accounts of the power of the established normative narrative, I suggest 
that this work suffers in much the same way as that which details the problematic 
structures or political economy of media in that it has the tendency to implicitly claim 
or at least draw attention to the idea that democratic culture is something that requires 
rehabilitation and that the media and journalism practice in particular, are important 
sites for such rehabilitation.  
This journalistic praxis is gauged in relation to what I would argue are a 
degraded set of democratic ideals and aspirations as they are no longer fit for purpose. 
However, in mining the lived experiences of journalism with a view to exposing the 
contradictions and tensions of the world that journalists inhabit, we have not 
interrogated with sufficient vigour, the purportedly self-evident democratic values and 
contexts in which the journalists themselves are positioned and grapple with on a day-
to-day basis. Such work tends to be divorced from a rigorous engagement with 
important concepts and debates such as the nature and character of political 
deliberation (for example), the substance of political culture, or indeed the character 
of democracy itself.  
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The crux of my argument therefore tallies with the sentiment expressed by 
Strmbck (2005) when he concludes by stating that  
Òonly by specifying what kind of democracy we are referring to when using the 
term, and by specifying its normative implications for media and journalism, 
that we can fully understand how media and journalism affect democracyÓ 
(Strmbck, 2005: 343). 
However, where I differ from Strmbck is that I advocate developing new ideas 
about democracy from which new normative bases for journalism might spring. 
While helpful in signalling how different models of democracy Ð procedural, 
competitive, participatory and deliberative - might require journalismÕs normative 
bases to reflect these differences and be developed into a standard, his analysis fail to 
move us into new realms of politics.  
Alternative Normativity 
It is all very well criticising the normative claims, implicit or otherwise, that are made 
in the name of journalism, but what alternatives do I offer to counter the malaise that I 
have attempted to signal? Ironically, I suggest that we mine the very same realms of 
thought and inquiry that proved so fruitful in the establishment of our earlier visions 
of journalism. I am not, however, suggesting that we return directly to the ideals of 
Madison, Mill and Dewey to re-imagine conceptions of engagement and political 
participation, but rather we look to their legacy within political theory and begin to 
rethink the nature of public deliberation and citizen engagement itself.  
One example might be the work of political theorist Jeffrey Green who, in his 
book The Eyes of the People: Democracy in an age of spectatorship (2010) 
challenges the essentially deliberative foundations of our contemporary political 
culture, arguing instead for more realistic expectations of what we understand 
political participation to be. Green criticises the largely deliberative or 'vocal' claims 
that are made about political engagement and participation noting that such 
deliberation rarely involves the wider public and is instead largely confined to an elite 
few. Green fundamentally questions the notion of genuine democratic participation 
and engagement as emerging from a discursive or deliberative base as envisioned by 
  12 
political theorists and media scholars alike. Returning to John Stuart Mill, Green 
notes that the author of On Liberty and Considerations on Representative Government 
had far too much faith in the power of journalism in particular in bridging the gap 
between government and representation. Mill was essentially ÔhyperidealisticÕ (p. 96) 
in that thinking the then  
modern technologies of public opinion formation (journalism) were sufficient to 
return to the People the very legislative power that representative government  - 
with its division between active and passive citizens Ð otherwise appeared to 
have sacrificed. (Green, 2010, 96) 
Green develops the idea of a 'plebiscitary' form of democratic participation and 
engagement that does not prioritise speech and dialogue over other forms of 
'engagement'. Green instead emphasizes the power of the public gaze, the act of 
looking and the politiciansÕ never ending public exposure as providing a realistic and 
sustainable form of political participation and legitimacy. Drawing on the work of 
Max Weber, Green suggests that WeberÕs conception of  
[T]he PeopleÕs gaze, in effect, creates a stage Ð and the stage was a device 
whereby leaders would be both elevated (empowered to speak in the name of 
the People or at least directly to the People) yet constrained by the very 
condition of publicity. (Green, 2010, 156) 
Echoing some of the disciplinary functions of the Panopticon (see Ball, 1994; Petley, 
2013), politicians on the public stage are both empowered and rendered subject to the 
PeopleÕs gaze as they Ôare compelled to appear in public under conditions they do not 
[always] controlÕ (p. 207). It is under these conditions of significant and constant 
scrutiny, removed from politiciansÕ ultimate control that Green calls the politics of 
candour. It is here then that Green develops the idea of a ÔplebiscitaryÕ democracy 
where the power of the people is vested not in their contribution to the discursive 
realm of politics, which Green asserts, is generally confined to an elite few, but in the 
PeopleÕs power to force political leaders to appear in public under the conditions of 
candour.  
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Though critics might charge Green with positing an essentially passive 
electorate, Green is aware that for the most part, most of us do not have much 
influence of the decisions that govern our lives. Yet of course, Green is aware that  
when the People is invoked, as it is after all by journalists and within popular 
culture, it is identified with the electorate that votes on election day and 
responds to opinion polls Ð a usage that is triply alienating vis--vis the 
everyday citizen insofar as it refers to the extraordinary and rare moment of 
election rather than the everyday, silent experience of politics; assumes that the 
citizen is part of the majority that wins elections rather than the minority that 
loses; and presupposes that the citizen identify with substantive opinions and 
decisions, even though on most particular issues citizens do not possess clear or 
stable preferences. (Green, 2010, 209, emphasis in the original) 
The extended quote above emphasises GreenÕs understanding of the objective reality 
that under the conditions of liberal democracy, the People at large cannot hope to 
exercise their deliberative power in a way that secures their particular interests and 
objectives. Rather, political power resides more broadly in the capacity of the People, 
all of them, not a select few, to ensure that under the conditions of candour, Ôpopular 
sovereignty ought to be reserved for Ð and revitalized through Ð the eyes of the 
PeopleÕ (p. 210).  
As we have seen, democratic deliberation is one of the cornerstones of 
journalismÕs rationale, at least as envisioned by many who wish to reform and revive 
journalismÕs democratic spirit. Yet GreenÕs book is an important contribution to the 
debate about journalismÕs normative foundations as it challenges the very same 
idealised deliberative model of democracy that is so engrained within our democratic 
and journalistic culture; a model of democracy that is clearly far from realisation. 
What Green offers instead is a form of political pragmatism that builds on the reality 
of liberal democratic constitutional arrangements and the PeopleÕs relationship to and 
with these arrangements. For journalism studies, the normative expectation that 
deliberation is superior to ÔmerelyÕ observing is severely challenged by GreenÕs 
thoughtful analysis as he pays attention to our capacity to make political decisions 
based on the visibility of our political representatives. His analysis does not therefore 
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place the heavy burden of deliberative politics on the public and likewise possibly 
offers a more pragmatic basis for, and expression of, political engagement.  
Another challenge to the security of our normative conventions within 
journalism, albeit from a much more radical perspective, emerges through the work of 
Jodi Dean (2010). Dean analyses how various public challenges to power, for 
example the worldwide protests against the Iraq war in 2003, the anti globalisation 
movements etc., are essentially articulated from within an ethical and technological 
framework that at the same time as providing space for critique, also limits its 
capacity for effective change. DeanÕs work attempts to rehabilitate a Marxian analysis 
which grapples with the complexities of contemporary capitalism in ways that offer 
new opportunities for understanding the very basis of democratic culture and critical 
politics. More specifically DeanÕs analysis of Ôcommunicative capitalismÕ orientates 
us towards thinking about how neo-liberalism in particular has co-opted much of the 
moral capital from the Left and incorporated it into its own manifestations of power 
and authority. She suggests that:  
communicative capitalism designates the strange merging of democracy 
and capitalism in which contemporary subjects are produced and trapped. 
It does so by highlighting the way networked communications bring the 
two together. The values heralded as central to democracy take material 
form in networked communications technologies. Ideals of access, 
inclusion, discussion, and participation come to be realized in and through 
expansions, intensifications, and interconnections of global 
telecommunications. (Dean, 2009, p. 22) 
Drawing on Zizek and Mouffe, she demonstrates that the communicative and 
deliberative opportunities provided by our new communication environment, are 
ultimately subsumed into the politics and culture of neo-liberal individualism in ways 
that block out the social context and our connection to the wider social world. In 
doing so, within this neo-liberal media context, opportunities to move outside or 
beyond our current predicaments are limited. Journalism and the new deliberative 
opportunities afforded by new media therefore reflect and reinforce the narrowing of 
our interpretative horizons. Similarly to Green, Dean takes aim at the ideals of 
deliberative democracy and suggests that deliberation is essentially a process that 
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ignores the fact that political decisions have to be made and that solving problems that 
deliberated decisions give rise to, tend to be ÔsolvedÕ by more deliberation. As such, 
democratic deliberation, as formulated by theorists such as Gutmann and Thompson 
(1996 & 2004) is self-justifying as a process as the Ôproblems it might encounter are 
best solved through more deliberationÕ ( Dean, 2009, p. 91). When decisions are 
made, usually at the expense of one set of ideals and perspectives, the problem is 
resolved by more and more deliberation and negotiation. The point that Dean is 
making is that democratic deliberation is in itself a process of delaying decisions or 
deferring responsibility from an equal plane of influence. This is simply not the case 
as politics requires that decisions be made thereby making alternative possibilities or 
outcomes not possible, until of course the consensus-based process of deliberation is 
revived once again. Ultimately, theorists who place too much weight on the 
democratic power of deliberation fail to see its limitations as a tool of political 
decision making  - a function of politics. For those of us concerned with how DeanÕs 
analysis of deliberation might contribute to normative foundations of journalismÕs 
democratic functioning, the outlook may seem grim, as it suggests we are condemned 
to stasis, seemingly unable to step outside of neo-liberalismÕs force. Yet DeanÕs 
analysis is progressive as it helps us understand how the corrosive capacity of neo-
liberalism has usurped the very language and tools that are fundamental to 
challenging the status quo. For scholars and journalists looking to build new 
normative horizons, DeanÕs work is a fruitful starting point as it alerts us to existing 
barriers and the Ôentrapment of psychotic politicsÕ that cannot seem to transcend the 
present condition (2009, p. 18). As she concludes, we may Ôhave an ethical sense. But 
we lack a coherent politics, primarily because we remain attached to our present 
valuesÓ (2009, 175).   
Conclusion 
The main aim of this chapter should be clear: it has been to assert that rather than 
focussing on an expectation that journalism should stimulate an essentially 
deliberative ideal in its nourishing of democracy, journalism studies scholars in 
particular might do well to leave aside some of these more cherished notions of 
journalismÕs normative heart and dare to go beyond some of the core assumptions 
central to our contemporary understanding of what journalism should do. In doing so 
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I have argued that for journalists and scholars of journalism, new perspectives on 
democracy and democratic agency might refresh our notions of what journalism 
might do in a time when the changes affecting journalism are so pronounced. It may 
not be that the link between democracy and journalism needs to be ÔretiredÕ as Zelizer 
(2013) suggests, rather it may be that the limitations of journalism should be seen in 
the context of the limitations of present democracy itself. As someone who has, in 
previous work, sought to re-articulate and re-state claims about journalism's 
democratic obligations and the essence of its democratic heart, I write this chapter as 
critical of myself as of others. In highlighting alternative sources of intellectual 
creativity by citing the contributions of Dean and Green as just two examples, I have 
attempted to prompt scholars of journalism to begin to step back and to reassess some 
of these core ideals, in much the same way that Green and Dean, albeit from very 
different political perspectives, have sought to do in relation to democracy and 
participation. These two very different analyses of democracy, political agency and 
culture are examples of work from political theory which do not shy away from 
asking difficult questions about the nature of democratic life, political participatoin 
and particularly the ideals of democratic deliberation. I suggest that we, as scholars of 
journalism studies, would do well to do the same. 
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